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STATE V. DIAMOND: COMPELLED
DISCLOSURE OF AN INFORMANT'S
IDENTITY AND THE LAW OF
INFORMANT PRIVILEGE AS A
FUNCTION OF NONCONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
RUSSELL D. GHENT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The South Carolina Supreme Court has recently articulated,
in State v. Diamond,1 an exception to the evidentiary privilege
which protects a police informant's identity. Although compelled
disclosure is one of the "fundamental requirements of fairness,"
'2
it is submitted that the use of such language, in the context of
the criteria governing the release of an informant's identity, is
based upon misinterpretation to the extent it suggests that the
disclosure standards have a constitutional basis. This Article
discusses Diamond and the origins of the informant privilege,
not as a constitutional mandate, but rather as a product of the
supervisory powers of courts to formulate rules of evidence.
II. BASIS OF THE PRIVILEGE AND ITS EXCEPTION
The informant's privilege is based on the policy of promot-
ing the obligation of the ordinary citizen to report crime by pre-
serving his anonymity.3 This policy of protecting the flow of in-
formation should be balanced against the individual's right to
prepare his defense,4 which right includes the ability to compel
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division of South Carolina Attor-
ney General's Office, 1979-81. Assistant Solicitor, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit for South
Carolina, 1981-Present. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Jan. 1984-Nov. 1984. B.A., Uni-
versity of South Carolina, 1973; J.D., University of South Carolina, 1977.
1. 280 S.C. 296, 312 S.E.2d 550 (1984).
2. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957).
3. Id. at 59.
4. Id. at 62.
1
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the attendance of and to confront witnesses."
The guarantee of compulsory process exists to protect the
accused's right to introduce witnesses in his behalf. In Washing-
ton v. State of Texas,6 the Supreme Court stated:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to
present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version
of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may
decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to
confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of chal-
lenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law.
7
The Court held that the defendant's right to compulsory process
outweighs the policies of a state statute barring an accomplice
from testifying for the accused.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, of
which the right of confrontation is a part, is of equal importance
in considering privilege. In California v. Green,8 the Supreme
Court held that the right to confront witnesses furthers the re-
quirement that all evidence presented in a criminal case must
possess sufficient indicia of reliability so that the trier of fact
may assess it rationally:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question
was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the pris-
oner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination
of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his de-
meanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.9
Similarly, in Chambers v. Mississippi,0 the Supreme Court
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. 388 US. 14 (1967).
7. Id. at 19.
8. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
9. Id. at 158-59 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
10. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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stated that rules of evidence may not be applied in a mechanical
way to defeat the ends of justice.
Although these constitutional guarantees are of great impor-
tance to our scheme of justice, no constitutional right is abso-
lute. Professor Westen explores the idea that privileges are
designed to protect important relationships and interests by en-
abling a witness to keep even reliable and relevant information
secret. The protection of these relationships and interests is said
to outweigh the pursuit of truth. Westen concludes, however,
that if an irreconcilable conflict arises between the policy of pre-
serving governmental interests and that of assuring a fair trial,
one must choose between preserving the privilege or prosecuting
the accused. In such a case, the government must waive its privi-
lege for the prosecution to continue. "Compulsory process does
not deny the government's interest in secrecy, but prohibits the
government from invoking secrecy at the defendant's expense.''
It is submitted that where the lives of informants and police of-
ficers are at stake, this conclusion is an oversimplification. Even
in those cases where the informant is a "mere tipster" (that is,
did not take part in the actual transaction constituting the
crime), withholding any information from a defendant disadvan-
tages him to some degree. However, to allow inquiry into every
tip would upset the operation of the criminal justice system.
This point was demonstrated in McCray v. State of Illinois,12
where the defendant demanded the identity of an informant
who supplied police with probable cause to search his person.
The Court quoted from a case where the New Jersey Supreme
Court had reasoned:
If a defendant may insist upon disclosure of the informant in
order to test the truth of the officer's statement that there is an
informant or as to what the informant related or as to the in-
formant's reliability, we can be sure that every defendant will
demand disclosure. He has nothing to lose and the price may
be the suppression of damaging evidence if the State cannot
afford to reveal its source, as is so often the case. And since
there is no way to test the good faith of a defendant who
presses the demand, we must assume the routine demand
11. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 163 (1974). See
generally id. at 159-177.
12. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
1985] 445
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would have to be routinely granted. The result would be that
the State could use the informant's information only as a lead
and could search only if it could gather adequate evidence of
probable cause apart from the informant's data. Perhaps that
approach would sharpen investigatorial techniques, but we
doubt that there would be enough talent and time to cope with
crime upon that basis. Rather we accept the premise that the
informer is a vital part of society's defensive arsenal. The basic
rule protecting his identity rests upon that belief.
13
13. Id. at 306-07 (quoting State v. Burnette, 42 N.J. 377, 385, 201 A.2d 39, 43-44
(1964)). The Uniform Rules of Evidence incorporate an attempted compromise solution
to the problem. Rule 509 provides:
(a) Rule of privilege. The United States or a state or subdivision thereof
has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has furnished
information relating to or assisting in an investigation of a possible violation of
a law to a law enforcement officer or member of a legislative committee or its
staff conducting an investigation.
(b) Who may claim. The privilege may be claimed by an appropriate rep-
resentative of the public entity to which the information was furnished.
(c) Exceptions
(1) Voluntary disclosure; informer a witness. No privilege exists
under this rule if the identity of the informer or his interest in the sub-
ject matter of his communication has been disclosed to those who would
have cause to resent the communication by a holder of the privilege or
by the informer's own action, or if the informer appears as a witness for
the government.
(2) Testimony on relevant issue. If it appears in the case that an
informer may be able to give testimony relevant to any issue in a crimi-
nal case or to a fair determination of a material issue on the merits in a
civil case to which a public entity is a party, and the informed public
entity invokes the privilege, the court shall give the public entity an op-
portunity to show in camera facts relevant to determining whether the
informer can, in fact, supply that testimony. The showing will ordinarily
be in the form of affidavits, but the court may direct that testimony be
taken if it finds that the matter cannot be resolved satisfactorily upon
affidavit. If the court finds there is a reasonable probability that the
informer can give the testimony, and the public entity elects not to dis-
close his identity, in criminal cases the court on motion of the defendant
or on its own motion shall grant appropriate relief, which may include
one or more of the following: requiring the prosecuting attorney to com-
ply, granting the defendant additional time or a continuance, relieving
the defendant from making disclosures otherwise required of him,
prohibiting the prosecuting attorney from introducing specified evi-
dence, and dismissing charges. In civil cases, the court may make any
order the interests of justice require. Evidence submitted to the court
shall be sealed and preserved to be made available to the appellate court
in the event of an appeal, and the contents shall not otherwise be re-
vealed without consent of the informed public entity. All counsel and
parties are permitted to be present at every stage of proceedings under
446 [Vol. 36
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III. State v. Diamond-COMPELLED DISCLOSURE BASED ON
SURROUNDING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
In State v. Diamond, an undercover police officer purchased
narcotics from a number of individuals as part of an extended
narcotics investigation. During the investigation, the officer pur-
chased heroin from Diamond, the defendant, after an informant
introduced Diamond to him. The defendant was arrested five
months after the transaction, and was later tried and convicted.
At his trial, Diamond testified that he was not present at the
scene of the transaction and contended that he had never seen
the officer who claimed to have purchased drugs from him. 14 Di-
amond's defense was not a true defense of alibi, that is, that he
was "elsewhere,"' 5 but instead was a simple denial of the of-
ficer's testimony identifying him as the person who sold drugs
on the day in question.
The evidence presented by the state disclosed that the in-
formant who made the introduction was more than a mere "tip-
ster." The testimony revealed that the informant told the defen-
dant immediately after the introduction that the officer wanted
"to pick up a package."16 The informant took a quantity of her-
oin from the defendant and gave it to the officer in exchange for
twenty-five dollars. The transaction was therefore initiated,
brokered, and consummated in the informant's presence, with
his full participation. Another officer monitored the transaction
with an electronic listening device. At trial, the second officer's
testimony did not corroborate or strengthen the undercover of-
ficer's identification of Diamond and was filled with inconsisten-
cies, inaccuracies, and misstatements of fact with respect to the
transaction. This testimony was described by the court as "at
best, confused and contradictory."'
1
1
The defendant moved to require the prosecution to disclose
the informant's identity. The trial court denied the motion and
Diamond appealed his later conviction based on the court's rul-
this subdivision except a showing in camera at which no counsel or
party shall be permitted to be present.
UNIF. R. EVID. 509.
14. 280 S.C. at 296, 312 S.E.2d at 550.
15. Id. at 297, 312 S.E.2d at 550.
16. Id. at 298, 312 S.E.2d at 551.
17. Id., 312 S.E.2d at 551.
19851
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ing on this issue. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
Diamond's conviction and held that disclosure was required
based on "the various factors and circumstances surrounding the
drug transaction and the testimony given by the police of-
ficers."'" The court analyzed the informant identity disclosure
issue in light of three prior decisions: Roviaro v. United States,19
a United States Supreme Court decision compelling disclosure in
a federal criminal proceeding; McLawhorn v. North Carolina,0 a
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision compelling disclosure
in a state criminal proceeding; and State v. Batson,21 an earlier
South Carolina Supreme Court decision refusing to compel dis-
closure in a state criminal proceeding. Each case was one of first
impression on the subject of informant privilege and involved a
generally similar factual situation. If the Fourth Circuit's "fun-
damental fairness" language in McLawhorn is correct in its im-
plication that the disclosure in Roviaro was mandated by the
Constitution,22 the decision in Batson appears to contravene
that federal mandate.
IV. Roviaro, McLawhorn AND Batson: COMPELLED DISCLOSURE
AND ITS CASES OF ORIGIN
The Supreme Court's 1957 decision in Roviaro is the semi-
nal case on the compelled disclosure of an informant's identity,
an exception to the informant's privilege. At the defendant's
trial for violating the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act,
23
the government relied on the testimony of two federal narcotics
agents and two state police officers. The four had engaged in the
surveillance of a drug transaction between the defendant and
the informant. The transaction took place in the informant's car,
with one of the local agents secreted in the trunk. The same of-
ficer overheard what he believed to be a conversation about the
sale of narcotics and saw the defendant, whom he knew by sight,
18. Id. at 299, 312 S.E.2d at 552.
19. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
20. 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973).
21. 261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517 (1973).
22. The court there concluded that "this refusal to reveal the identity of a partici-
pant in the offenses charged constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness required by the
fourteenth amendment." 484 F.2d at 2-3.
23. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1976).
[Vol. 36
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retrieve a package from a tree, return to the informant's car, de-
posit the package, and walk away. One of the federal agents
found the package immediately thereafter when he went to the
car. That package contained narcotics.
Less than an hour after the transaction, the defendant and
the informant were taken into custody, the latter to preserve his
confidentiality. At trial, it was undisputed that on the night of
the arrest, while in the stationhouse with the defendant present,
the informant indicated to the arresting officers that he did not
know the defendant. Although a majority of the Court con-
cluded that this fact undermined the identification of the defen-
dant, the statement could have been explained by the fact that
it appears the informant was still playing his role as a codefend-
ant in order to prevent disclosure of his informant status. 4 In its
analysis, the Court in Roviaro balanced the public interest in
protecting the flow of information about criminal activities
against the defendant's right to prepare and present his de-
fense.25 Recognizing several instances where the informant's
privilege would be inapplicable, the Court stated that one such
exception existed where disclosure is "relevant and helpful to
the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination
of a cause."2 6 In concluding that "no fixed rule with respect to
disclosure is justifiable," the Court stated that the issue must be
resolved in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, in-
cluding, for example, the crime charged, potential defenses, and
the likely significance of the informant's testimony.
Several of the foregoing factors noted by the Court in
Roviaro warrant further discussion. First, assuming that Roviaro
has federal constitutional bases, any state action in criminal pro-
ceedings violates the fourteenth amendment due process guaran-
tees if that action abridges a right of the accused that is "funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice. '28 In Roviaro, the
24. See 353 U.S. at 67-68 (Clark, J., dissenting).
25. 353 U.S. at 62.
26. Id. at 60-61.
27. Id. at 62.
28. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969). It should be noted that the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically relied on this decision in conjunction with
Roviaro for the proposition that "limitations on the privilege of nondisclosure arise from
the Fourth Amendment's requirement of fundamental fairness to the accused." 484 F.2d
at 5.
1985] 449
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fundamental right apparently at issue was "the individual's right
to prepare his defense. 29 The criminal statute involved allowed
conviction unless the accused explained or justified possession of
narcotics.30 The character of this statute was of particular im-
portance to the Court's decision that the government had allo-
cated a burden of proof to the defendant and had unfairly with-
held from him the means of satisfying that burden when it
denied him potentially material information-an informant's
identity. Although the Court concluded that the statute was not
a "burden shifting" provision and that it "merely places on the
accused, at a certain point, the burden of going forward with his
defense," 31 subsequent analysis of the constitutionality of pre-
sumptions in criminal law has blurred the distinction.32
The other key determinant of compelled disclosure in
Roviaro was the use of the defendant's remarks to the informant
during the transaction. The Court categorized this factor as one
which "particularly emphasizes the unfairness of the nondisclo-
sure," for only the informant could "controvert, explain, or am-
plify" 33 the officer's testimony as to the defendant's statements.
It is submitted that the use of such hearsay testimony is not a
matter of constitutional dimensions in all instances.3 4 Addition-
ally, Roviaro was tried before a judge alone,3 an instance that
generally permits a judge, as fact finder, to consider evidence
more prejudicial than a jury under the same circumstances.36
It is clear, then, that the Court in Roviaro reasoned that the
defendant's rights to prepare and present his defense were fun-
damentally jeopardized both because it was impossible for him
to satisfy the burden allocated to him and because he was not
29. 353 U.S. at 62.
30. Id. at 62-63.
31. Id. at 63.
32. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975). But see State v. Gaines, 271 S.C. 65, 244 S.E.2d 539 (1978); State v. Attardo,
263 S.C. 546, 211 S.E.2d 868 (1975).
33. 353 U.S. at 64.
34. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968). The Court in Dutton stated: "It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But
this Court has never equated the two, and we decline to do so now." 400 U.S. at 80.
35. 353 U.S. at 55.
36. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128-29; Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 69-70 (1979);
In re Lawson, 273 S.C. 560, 562, 257 S.E.2d 745, 746 (1979).
[Vol. 36
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allowed to "confront" a witness who may or may not have been
adverse to his interests, had he chosen to call that witness in his
behalf. The Court weighed other facts against protecting the in-
formant's identity. These facts included that the informant set
up the transaction and was prominent in its actual completion,
and that it was possible that his testimony might have disclosed
an entrapment or cast doubt upon the defendant's identity as
the one who delivered the package or upon the composition of
the package itself.3 7 Additionally, the majority in Roviaro noted,
in the opinion's closing lines, that a minor inconsistency in the
chain of evidence was an additional factor that affected the
credibility of two of the officers, giving further reason for
disclosure."
In McLawhorn v. North Carolina,39 the defendant, who was
being prosecuted for selling drugs, filed a petition for habeas
corpus in federal district court, alleging that the State's refusal
to reveal the identity of an informant was a denial of due pro-
cess.40 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Roviaro, con-
cluded that a refusal to reveal the identity of a participant in
the transaction constituted "a denial of fundamental fairness re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment ' 41 and ordered the defen-
dant released or retried within a reasonable period of time.
McLawhorn's conviction resulted from an extended narcot-
ics investigation by an undercover police officer, similar to that
in Roviaro, covering a period of approximately four months. The
informant introduced McLawhorn to the undercover officer and,
during their meeting, the defendant sold cocaine to the officer.
The transaction occurred in the defendant's car, the informant
arranged and negotiated it, and both the officer and the inform-
ant exchanged money with the defendant. As in Diamond and
Roviaro, the informant's full participation in the transaction was
uncontested.
The court in McLawhorn looked at the totality of attendant
37. 353 U.S. at 64.
38. Id. at 65.
39. 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973).
40. It should be noted that the defendant in this instance appears to have been
given opportunity in a state court to litigate a federal constitutional issue which was
decided adversely to him. As to subsequent litigation of other due process issues in fed-
eral collateral proceedings, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 483 (1976).
41. 484 F.2d at 2.
1985]
9
Ghent: State v. Diamond: Compelled Disclosure of an Informant's Identity
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
circumstances in reaching its conclusion that disclosure of the
informant's identity was compelled by "fundamental fairness.""'
Further, although the decision does attach particular signifi-
cance to the informant's role as "participant" as opposed to
mere "tipster, '43 the recent case of United States v. Brinkman"
indicates that the Fourth Circuit's analysis will not focus on the
labels given the role of the informant in a transaction but rather
on the "propriety of the district court's assessment of the
Roviaro balance in light of 'the particular circumstances' of the
case."'45 The district court in Brinkman balanced the concerns as
follows:
This Court is persuaded that the public interest in main-
taining the anonymity of an undercover agent who, according
to the Government's statement, is currently involved in other
investigations which would be virtually crippled by revealing
the agent's true identity, outweighs the need for the Defendant
to learn the true identity of an agent who was not a witness or
a participant in the crime with which the Defendant has been
charged, and was minimally involved with introducing the De-
fendant to a government agent."
6
Thus, because the court relied strongly on the Roviaro balance
in its recent consideration of the issue, the most important as-
pect of McLawhorn appears to be its strong factual similarity to
Roviaro.
The case of first impression on compelled disclosure in
South Carolina is State v. Batson,47 a 1973 decision that pre-
dated McLawhorn by a single month. In Batson, two women ap-
proached the defendant and his friend at a bar and indicated
their desire to purchase narcotics. When the friend indicated
that he would sell narcotics he had hidden at another location,
the women, who were State Law Enforcement Division (SLED)
informants, contacted a SLED agent. The agent arrived at the
bar soon thereafter with another male agent. After introductions
and preliminary negotiations, all of the parties left the bar and
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
44. 739 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 981.
46. Id. (citing the district court).
47. 261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517 (1973).
452 [Vol. 36
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went to a site where the friend retrieved a package. The parties
then traveled to the friend's house. Once there, the parties
counted money and narcotic tablets but the exchange was
delayed to allow the informants to leave before any arrests were
made. After the informants departed, the transaction was com-
pleted and the defendant and his friend, a juvenile, were ar-
rested for distribution of the narcotic LSD.
The juvenile friend pleaded guilty to the charge against
him. Batson, however, contended that he did not participate in
the crime. After the state presented its case against Batson, con-
sisting of the testimony of a single SLED agent, the juvenile was
called on Batson's behalf. Both he and Batson testified that Bat-
son's only interest throughout the evening in question was the
amorous pursuit of one of the female informants. Both testified
that during the counting of the drugs and money and the negoti-
ations that took place with the SLED agents, Batson was in a
bedroom with one of the informants. However, Batson did not
make an effort, prior to trial, to determine the informant's
identity.48
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to compel disclosure of the informant's identity.
The court began its analysis by stating that the informant privi-
lege has a common law origin. The court addressed Roviaro and
its balancing test, but pointed out that the burden rests on the
defendant, by timely motion,49 to show facts and circumstances
which establish that his need for disclosure outweighs society's
interest in protecting the flow of information by secreting an in-
formant's identity. The court in Batson found that the request
for disclosure was "raised purely as a matter of trial strategy."5
It was intended "to serve the dual purpose of creating doubt in
the minds of the jurors and laying a possible ground for appeal
in the event of conviction."' Because Batson made no effort
prior to trial to obtain the informant's identity, the court con-
cluded that the motion for disclosure was properly refused.
It is submitted that McLawhorn and Diamond share such
48. Id. at 131, 198 S.E.2d at 519-520.
49. Id. at 134-35, 198 S.E.2d at 520.
50. Id. at 135, 198 S.E.2d at 520.
51. Id.
1985]
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sufficient factual similarity with Roviaro, the "leading case ' 52 on
informant privilege, that the result should be the same in all
three cases. The more fundamental question is whether the Con-
stitution mandates that the result in all three be the same, or
whether Roviaro merely suggests it in such words that the
whisper of "fundamental requirements of fairness" is misinter-
preted as the shout of due process guaranteed by constitutional
principle. It is, after all, curious that the opinion of Justice Bur-
ton in Roviaro speaks in terms of "reversible error, ' 53 of "preju-
dicial error, ' 54 and of the basic "unfairness of the nondisclo-
sure 5 5 on the facts before the Court and yet clearly and most
carefully refrains from holding that due process was violated on
the totality of those facts in issue. Further, the Court in Roviaro
clearly and carefully omits any reference whatsoever to due pro-
cess or the specific part of the Constitution which compels the
result. However, the opinion contains clear support for the pro-
position that the common law furnishes the basis for the privi-
lege, apart from any constitutional requirements, and permits an
exception based upon the needs of fairness and upon a sufficient
showing that disclosure is "material to the ends of justice.
'5 6
The decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Bat-
son can be rationalized, on the other hand, on the record's fail-
ure to demonstrate a bona fide need for disclosure, and on the
assertion of "need" purely as a matter of trial strategy. The dis-
sent of Justice Clark in Roviaro addressed this same considera-
tion, categorizing the efforts of the defense in that case as "shad-
owboxing with the prosecution . . . hoping to get a reversible
error.) 57 The fact that, thirty years later, the defense bar com-
monly terms Roviaro's strategy of waiving a jury trial and hav-
ing the matter tried before the court alone as a "slow guilty
plea" also lends support to this contention.
Diamond cited three precedents for the standard governing
the privilege and its exception. Although these precedents at
first appear to have constitutional underpinnings, the factors
52. 280 S.C. at 297, 312 S.E.2d at 550. The court in Diamond called Roviaro the
leading case on informant privilege.
53. 353 U.S. at 55.
54. Id. at 65.
55. Id. at 64.
56. Id. at 61 n.9.
57. 353 U.S. at 70 (Clark, J., dissenting).
454 [Vol. 36
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and circumstances discussed by the court in Diamond, when ex-
amined further, represent three basic common law concerns that
weigh substantially for disclosure, apart from any constitutional
mandate. It is submitted that the court in Diamond was guided
primarily by these three criteria as a method of balancing policy
and fairness in ruling that the trial judge in that case abused his
discretion in not compelling disclosure of the informant's
identity.
First, the court in Diamond focused upon the establishment
of a bona fide need for disclosure by the defendant.58 The record
indicated that the undercover police officer was involved in a
long-term investigation, requiring many purchases from a num-
ber of suspects. The investigation occurred over a period of
months, and more than eleven months elapsed between the of-
ficer's single four or five minute transaction with the defendant
and the trial date. By presenting these facts, the defendant
clearly established a genuine identification issue.
Second, the court's opinion addressed generally the actions
of law enforcement in undertaking the investigation, including
the decision to involve the informant personally in the actual
transaction. This involvement made the informant a participant
and material witness rather than a mere tipster. It is questiona-
ble whether an informant's identity is truly confidential when he
is extensively involved in a large investigation. 9
Finally, perhaps the most significant factor in the analysis
was the Diamond court's assessment of the potential that exists
for abuse of the privilege with respect to testimony. Unlike
Roviaro, where the Court merely alluded to the potential, the
Diamond court found that the testimony of at least one of the
officers involved raised reasonable and substantial questions of
veracity.60 Under those circumstances, the Diamond court ap-
peared particularly concerned with assuring that the defendant
had an opportunity to determine whether the informant's testi-
mony would help or damage his cause.
An adequate nonconstitutional basis therefore exists for the
decision in Diamond; the court merely weighs competing eviden-
tiary interests in balancing the privilege against the case for dis-
58. 280 S.C. at 297, 312 S.E.2d at 551.
59. Id. at 297-98, 312 S.E.2d at 551.
60. Id. at 298, 312 S.E.2d at 551.
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closure. The court does this by assessing all factors and circum-
stances, by scrutinizing the defendant's need for the informant's
identity, and by examining the reasonableness of the claim of
privilege and the potential for the abuse of testimony. The ques-
tion remains, however, whether the "fairness" at stake in this
process is also one of constitutional dimensions.
V. Colorado v. Nunez AND COMPELLED DISCLOSURE AS A
MATTER OF STATE LAW
In a recent case, Colorado v. Nunez,61 the United States Su-
preme Court indicated that compelling informant disclosure is
basically a matter of limiting a common law evidentiary privi-
lege, rather than a matter of enforcing a constitutional require-
ment. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed a writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted, "it appearing that the judg-
ment of the court below rested on independent and adequate
state grounds. 6 2 Justice White concurred in the dismissal,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O'Conner, and under-
scored the fact that the federal constitution did not compel the
result reached by the state court.63 Justice White wrote that the
state court based its decision on a state rule of law compelling
disclosure of an informant's identity upon a showing of a reason-
able basis for questioning the accuracy of informant information
contained in a search warrant.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Nunez affirmed the trial
court's suppression of seized evidence after the state refused to
disclose an informant's identity. At the suppression hearing, the
defendant offered testimony disputing the facts which formed
the basis of the warrant to search the defendant's house. After
the court granted the suppression motion, the state took an in-
terlocutory appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court.64 That court
affirmed the trial court's judgment "solely on the ground that
61. 104 S. Ct. 1257, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984).
62. Id.
63. Id. (White, J., concurring).
64. In South Carolina, an appeal in a criminal case cannot be taken until the final
judgment is rendered on the indictment. An appeal which is taken from a pre-trial ruling
is interlocutory in nature and may be dismissed. State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d
459 (1982); State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 290 S.E.2d 817 (1982); State v. Thomas, 275
S.C. 274, 269 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
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disclosure of the informant's identity was essential to [the de-
fendant's] motion to suppress. '6 5 Concurring that "neither the
federal constitution nor any decision of this Court"66 requires
such a result, Justice White in Nunez stated that the Colorado
rule authorizing a defendant at a suppression hearing to im-
peach the credibility of an informant, and not just the credibil-
ity of an affiant, rested largely on state law. 7 The particular de-
cisions of the Colorado Supreme Court which create this rule,68
however, appear to be rooted in the Colorado court's analysis of
two United States Supreme Court decisions, Franks v. Dela-
ware6 9 and Roviaro.
The Court held in Franks that where a defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that a statement substantiating
a finding of probable cause was false and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard, included by the affiant in a search warrant
affidavit, the defendant is entitled to a separate evidentiary
hearing into the veracity of the warrant allegations. If the defen-
dant's allegations are established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and the court concludes that the false information is es-
sential to establish probable cause, the warrant is void and the
evidence seized pursuant to it must be suppressed. The Court in
Franks, however, specified that the rule announced "has a lim-
ited scope17 0 and that the decision was intended to allow im-
peachment "only.. . of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental
informant. 7 1 The decision in Franks distinguished an earlier
decision of the Court, Rugendorf v. United States,72 where a
motion to suppress based on inaccuracies in the affidavit was
held properly denied on grounds that the misstatements there
"were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable
cause, and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affi-
ant, did not go to the integrity of the affidavit. '7 3 The majority
65. 104 U.S. at 1257 (White, J., concurring).
66. Id. (White, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1257-58 (White, J., concurring).
68. People v. Martinez, 658 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1983); People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068
(Colo. 1982).
69. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
70. Id. at 167.
71. Id. at 171.
72. 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
73. Id. at 532.
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opinion in Rugendorf was written by Justice Tom C. Clark,74 au-
thor of the dissenting opinion in Roviaro, and made no mention
of a constitutional basis for informant disclosure in its brief dis-
cussion of Roviaro
7 5
At the heart of Justice White's opinion in Nunez is McCray
v. Illinois,76 in which the Court declined to hold that an inform-
ant's identity must always be disclosed in criminal proceed-
ings." Of particular significance in McCray was the discussion of
federal court informant disclosure solely in the context of the
Court's power to formulate evidentiary rules for federal criminal
cases. The Court repeatedly referred to the same issue presented
on a state court appeal as one of state evidence law. The Court
stated that by 'permitting the prosecution to withhold the in-
formant's identity, the Illinois Supreme Court "was following
well-settled Illinois law,"17 8 an "Illinois evidentiary rule, 7 and a
"well-established testimonial privilege, long familiar to the law
of evidence."8' 0 The Court pointed out that it has "the ultimate
task of defining the scope to be accorded to the various common
law evidentiary privileges in the trial of federal criminal
cases[,]. . . [a] task which is quite different, of course, from the
responsibility of constitutional adjudication."81 Roviaro was then
discussed as a product of this "supervisory jurisdiction,"" and
not as a case involving constitutional adjudication.
The Court in McCray removed itself further from the sug-
gestion that due process was at issue in Roviaro by broadening
the context of the decision to one "where the issue was the fun-
74. In his opinion in Rugendorf and in his dissent in Roviaro, Justice Clark focused
on a practical analysis of the problems and concerns of law enforcement in using infor-
mants in criminal case investigation. This would be a natural extension of his twelve
years as a federal criminal prosecutor, the last four of which were served as Attorney
General of the United States. Perhaps the credibility wrought by this practical knowl-
edge of the subject matter accounts for the tentative language of the majority opinion in
Roviaro. The author of that majority opinion, Justice Burton, was a former United
States Senator, state legislator, and Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio.
75. 376 U.S. at 534-35.
76. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
77. See also State v. Bernotas, 277 S.C. 106, 283 S.E.2d 580 (1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1017 (1982); State v. Shupper, 263 S.C. 53, 207 S.E.2d 799 (1974).
78. 386 U.S. at 305.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 308.
81. Id. at 309.
82. Id.
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damental one of innocence or guilt. ' s3 The Court in McCray
then removed any doubt that it intended by its decision to
render Roviaro a constitutional nullity when it stated that the
Roviaro court "carefully reviewed"84 the circumstances of
Roviaro's trial for the particular factors which compelled disclos-
ure. The discussion in McCray not only omitted the two key fac-
tors which stood as the particular "constitutional" concerns of
the Court in Roviaro, but found no support for the petitioner's
position that either of two constitutional provisions were vio-
lated by the circumstances of McCray's trial, 5 both assertions
apparently formulated to match Justice Burton's analysis in
Roviaro."6
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Dia-
mond is the first articulation, by a South Carolina court, of fac-
tors and criteria to be balanced in favor of compelled disclosure
of an informant's identity. In reaching its conclusion, the court
appeared to have been particularly influenced by factors which
established (1) the defendant's bona fide need for such informa-
tion in preparing and proving his defense, (2) the unreasonable-
ness of law enforcement in relying on the privilege at trial in
light of its conduct preceding arrest and trial, and (3) the per-
ceived potential for law enforcement abuse of the privilege on
the record before the court. All of these criteria reflect policy
considerations and competing interests which the highest court
of any state might weigh in limiting the scope of its own eviden-
tiary privilege, or which a state legislature might consider in
codifying the privilege and its limitations.8s
83. Id.
84. Id. at 310-11.
85. Id. at 312-14. The court there was referring to arguments based on the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment and the sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion, as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
86. 353 U.S. at 62-64.
87. On March 1, 1984, legislation providing that the name of an informant might
not be disclosed except under certain circumstances was introduced in the South Caro-
lina Senate and was referred to the Judiciary Committee. This bill, S.840, died in Com-
mittee. For other discussion of the interaction between the judiciary and the legislature
in promulgating rules of evidence, see Ghent, Victim Testimony in Sex Crime Prosecu-
tions, 34 S.C.L. REv. 583 (1982).
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Although Diamond defers to the decision in Roviaro as the
"leading case" on informant privilege, this 1957 decision of the
United States Supreme Court is also the leading source of confu-
sion on whether limitations on informant privilege are matters
of constitutional adjudication or are based on the authority of
the courts of various jurisdictions to formulate rules of evidence.
Cases such as McCray and Nunez indicate that Roviaro's sug-
gestion that the issue is one of constitutional proportions is of
questionable continued validity.
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